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Is Posner’s Principle of Justice an Adequate Basis  
for Environmental Law? 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Posner adopted the economic principle of wealth maximization as a guiding principle 
for the dispensation of justice. This resulted in his endorsing the Kaldor-Hicks 
principle (also known as the potential Paretian improvement principle) as a basis for 
just laws. This article explores whether this principle is an adequate basis for 
environmental law. As can be deduced from Fleming, the legal approach adopted by 
Posner is by no means new because early British tort law was applied in a manner 
intended to foster economic growth. Nevertheless, the wealth maximization principle 
is not adequate as a basis for just environmental laws because for one thing it ignores 
questions involving changes in income distribution. Consequently, Rawls’ principle of 
justice is examined and compared with that of Posner. The role of property rights in 
relation to the state of the environment is assessed in the light of Posner’s principle of 
justice, as is Coase’s theorem supporting a clear definite allocation of private property 
rights as a solution to environmental problems. Furthermore, in this context, the 
justification for the taking of private property by the state is examined. It is argued 
that additional factors to wealth maximization and income distribution must be taken 
into account in determining whether laws are just. In addition, it is suggested that it is 
not the sole purpose of the law to dispense justice. 
 
Keywords: Coase theorem, law and economics, Posner’s principle of justice, 
principles of justice, property rights, Rawls’ principle of justice, tort law, welfare 
economics. 
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Is Posner’s Principle of Justice an Adequate Basis  
for Environmental Law? 
 
1. Introduction 
Posner (1981, 1985, 1987) has advocated as just laws and legal decisions that promote 
the maximization of economic wealth. The purpose of this article is to consider the 
adequacy of this rule as a principle of justice, particularly in relation to laws and legal 
decisions affecting the state of the environment and the use of natural resources. 
Posner’s advocacy does not seem to be new. According to Fleming (1977, p.8), 
British tort law was after the start of the Industrial Revolution interpreted by British 
judges by favouring legal decisions that promoted economic growth. Several 
economists by supporting the Kaldor-Hicks criterion (also known as the Paretian 
potential improvement criterion) have also added their weight in favour of policies 
that increase economic wealth in aggregate. However, Posner’s principle is rejected 
by some social philosophers of which John Rawls (1971) is a prominent one. His 
principle of justice differs substantially from that of Posner and in many 
circumstances, conflicts with it because of its heavy emphasis on income distribution 
as a factor in the dispensation of justice. 
These views are discussed in turn and subsequently, Coase’s theorem is examined 
(Coase, 1960). This theorem advocates the precise specification of property rights in 
order to increase wealth by ensuring that the use of environmental resources is better 
managed. Coase’s theorem highlights shortcomings of Posner’s principle of justice. In 
the final discussion, general limitations of the application to environmental law of the 
principles of Posner and of Rawls are outlined. 
2. Posner’s Principle and Economic Concepts of Welfare 
During the first half of the 20th century, economists developed several concepts and 
criteria for determining the impacts of economic policies on the welfare of groups of 
individuals, that is their social welfare. An increase in social welfare was taken as an 
indication that society was better off or ‘wealthier’. Adam Smith (1910; first 
published in 1776) had already indicated that the wealth of a nation is most 
appropriately indicated by the well-being of its citizens and not by its accumulation of 
precious metals (such as gold) and similar assets. This view differed from that of the 
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Mercantilists who believed that the accumulation of such objects added to national 
wealth. This is mentioned because Posner’s concept of wealth accords with that of 
those economists who attempt to measure wealth in terms of social (economic) 
welfare. 
Pareto (1896-97) suggested that any change that made some individuals better off in 
society without making any worse off would increase social welfare, and therefore, 
the wealth of society. This was politically a relatively conservative principle because 
it accepted the existing distribution of rights as given. It tended to uphold the existing 
social order. In addition, it transpired that few policies were possible that would 
satisfy the rule. However, the application of the rule is widened if in cases where 
some gain and some lose from a change in the law, the gainers can actually 
compensate the losers and be better off than before the change in the law or policy. 
Nevertheless, institutional mechanisms may not be available to ensure such a 
redistribution. Or the transaction costs involved in making the redistribution after the 
change in the law or policy may be so high that the aggregate economic benefit of the 
change is annulled or a considerable reduction in aggregate economic benefit occurs. 
This led some economists to advocate a different rule; one that is at the core of 
Posner’s principle of justice. 
Because of the limited scope for applying the Paretian improvement criterion, Kaldor 
(1939) and Hicks (1939) suggested the Paretian improvement criterion (also known as 
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion) as an alternative. According to their rule a change in the 
law or policy is socially desirable if those who would gain from the change could 
compensate those who are made worse off by it and still be better off than before this 
change. Actual compensation may or may not be paid by the beneficiaries of the 
change to the losers. If this criterion is applied and a potential Paretian improvement 
occurs, it is one possible indication that the wealth of society has increased. It is the 
criterion that Posner had mind when he proposed that laws should be designed and 
interpreted to maximize wealth in order to be just. 
Hicks (1939) believed that application of the potential Paretian improvement criterion 
would result, in most instances, in everyone in society being made better off. 
Although when this principle is applied to particular policies or in relevant laws, some 
gain and some may lose, when many different policies and laws are considered 
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together, the overall gains of individuals are likely to exceed their losses in his view. 
Hence, the welfare (wealth) of all would increase; an actual Paretian improvement 
would occur. The result, however, depends on the extent to which actual pooling of 
gains and losses from changes in the law and in policies occur. Consider an 
environmental example. 
Suppose that an entity A engages in an activity that benefits A by the equivalent of 
$100 but that (as a result of an environmental spillover) it disadvantages another 
entity, B, by $10. A’s activity can either be allowed or not allowed; a dichotomous 
social choice is assumed. If the potential Paretian improvement criterion is applied, 
A’s activity ought to be allowed because if A pays $10 to B, A has a net gain of $90 
as a result of the activity. 
Now imagine that B engages also in an activity that benefits B but due to an 
unfavourable spillover disadvantages A. Imagine that the benefit to B from this 
activity is equivalent to $80 and the disbenefit to A from it is $20. Once again, the 
potential Paretian improvement criterion would allow B’s activity to occur. 
If both A and B are allowed to engage in their activities causing negative 
environmental spillovers, both are better off than if neither are allowed to do this. A is 
better off by the equivalent of $80 ($100 − $20) and B is better off by the equivalent 
of $70 ($80 − $10). Thus in this case, Hick’s suggestion that all might gain as a result 
of collective decisions is satisfied if the potential Paretian rule is applied. To ban the 
above mentioned activities of A and B would reduce wealth. 
However, such offsets of gains and losses do not always occur, and even when they 
do, the distribution of income may be radically altered. Consequently, application of 
the Kaldor-Hicks principle may not always result in justice being done. Attention 
therefore, needs to be given to the consequences of the law for the distribution of 
income and whether or not its outcomes can be regarded as just. Scitovsky (1941) 
argued that the Kaldor-Hicks principle is only a straightforward guide to desirable 
policy if its application does not result in a worsening of the distribution of income. 
Social values are involved in deciding whether the distribution of income has 
worsened. If, as a result of a policy change it has worsened but there is a Kaldor-
Hicks gain, this gain must be balanced against the deterioration in the distribution of 
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income to decide the social desirability of the policy change. Consequently, the 
distribution of income is an issue to be considered in the dispensation of justice. 
3. Rawls’ Principle of Justice 
Whereas Posner emphasised aggregate wealth creation as a guide to just laws, Rawls 
believes that just laws or policies must be based on their consequences for income 
distribution. According to Rawls (1971), the incomes of individuals should be equal 
unless income inequality is to the benefit of all. His view is that our individual 
economic fortunes in life depend on our situation at birth and that this is determined 
by chance. He argues that if all individuals could enter into an agreement prior to their 
birth (not then knowing the situation into which they would be born), they would opt 
for his principle. While Rawls’ principle can be criticised on several grounds (see, for 
example, Tisdell, 1999; 2000, Ch.11), it provides a different perspective on justice to 
that of Posner. The difference can be highlighted by a couple of cases. 
Consider the environmental spillover examples outlined in the previous section and 
suppose that the only spillover that occurs is that A has an adverse environmental 
spillover on B. Given the payoffs previously mentioned, Posner would approve of it 
because A gains more than B loses but Rawls would reject A’s activity if B happened 
to be poorer than A. On the other hand, if there are reciprocal spillovers of the type 
specified above, Rawls’ principle would permit the externalities because both A and B 
benefit. 
The second case has to do with intergenerational equity and the sustainability of 
incomes Rawls’ principle is widely believed to be favourable to the adoption of 
development strategies designed to ensure that the incomes of future generations are 
no lower than those of current generations. This is likely to require greater 
conservation of natural capital than if the aggregate wealth of all generations taken 
together is maximized. Sometimes, this wealth maximization criterion may sanction 
the income of current generations being higher than that of future generations. Rawls’ 
principle would reject this as inequitable if the higher income of current generations is 
obtained at the expense of that of future generations. In these circumstances, one 
might expect laws based on Rawls’ principle compared to Posner’s to be less tolerant 
of actions by current generations that reduce the stock of natural resources available to 
future generations. 
4 
4.  Coase’s Theorem and Posner’s Principle of Justice 
Coase’s theorem highlights several difficulties with Posner’s principle of justice. 
Coase (1960) asserts that in the absence of transaction costs, and if environmental 
externalities occur, a Paretian efficient outcome can be achieved if legal rights are 
clearly specified, so that either those causing an adverse environmental externality are 
given the legal right to generate it or those who are adversely affected by it are given 
the right to be free of it. In these cases, a Paretian efficient outcome would be assured 
by means of bargaining between the parties. In order to illustrate Coase’s theorem, 
consider the emission of an air pollutant. Those who emit the pollutant obtain a 
marginal benefit indicated by line ABC in Figure 1 and those who are victims of the 
pollution incur a marginal disbenefit shown by line OBD in this figure. The Paretian 
efficient level of pollution in x1. If polluters have the right to pollute, victims would 
have to pay them an amount equal to the area of triangle ECB to entice them to reduce 
their emissions from x2 to x1. If on the other hand, victims have the right to a 
pollution-free environment, polluters would need to pay victims the equivalent of the 
area of triangle OEB to emit x1 of pollutants. 
 
A 
O x1 
E C
x2 x 
D
B
$ 
Quantity of air pollution emitted per period 
Marginal benefit to 
polluters 
Marginal disbenefit 
to victims 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A diagram designed to illustrate Coase’s theorem 
In the theoretical situation considered by Coase, the income distribution consequences 
of achieving Paretian optimality (wealth maximization) differ considerably depending 
upon which party is assigned the right to use the environment. Nevertheless, Posner 
would consider either the allocation of those rights to polluters or to the victims of 
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pollution to be just because either allocation results in wealth maximization, if 
Coase’s theorem holds. However, members of most communities are likely to 
disagree with this view. For example, there may be a presumption that the polluter 
should pay rather than the victims of the pollution. There have been many advocates 
(including economists) of the polluter-pays principle. 
The search for a just solution to such environmental issues may, however, involve 
additional considerations to wealth maximization. If polluters are rich and the victims 
of the pollution are poor, many may believe it just that the polluters should 
compensate victims for the pollution they generate. On the other hand, if polluters are 
poor and victims are rich, it might be believed to be equitable for the victims to pay 
polluters for reducing their emissions of pollutants. 
In some instances also the dispensation of justice depends upon the evolutionary 
sequence of rights to use the environment, as for example discussed by Pitchford and 
Snyder (2003). De facto rights to use the environment may develop which were 
wealth-maximizing it an earlier time but at a later time are not due to changing 
circumstances. For example, a piggery may be established on the outskirts of a city. In 
the early years of its existence, its environmental spillovers (noxious smells, noise and 
sewage) cause no communal (environmental) problems but as the city expands, urban 
settlement near the piggery grows and wealth would be maximized by the piggery 
relocating further away from the expanding city. City-dwellers have come to the 
environmental nuisance. Should the developers of housing estates have to pay the 
piggery to move? What factors should be taken into account in deciding a just 
solution in this case? For example, is it relevant that the owner of the piggery could 
have predicted the expansion of the city to the vicinity of the piggery? If so, the owner 
should have been aware of the pending conflict of interest and this might affect 
judgment on the case. It is not intended to go into the specifics here since the main 
point I want to make is that the dispensation of justice in the settlement of 
environmental issues is not solely dependent on considerations involving wealth or 
income distribution. Many other factors can also be relevant. 
A further problem for Posner’s principle of justice is that the valuation of wealth is 
not independent of the distribution of rights in resources, including rights to use the 
environment. In general, Posner does not specify how wealth is to be measured and 
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this is a serious weakness of his approach. The problem is that the valuation of what is 
claimed to be wealth is not independent of the entitlements of individuals. This is also 
a problem for Coase’s theorem. This can be illustrated by a particular case. 
Several scholars have observed on the basis of empirical evidence that the willingness 
to pay to avoid an environmental nuisance is usually much less than the willingness to 
accept compensation to allow it (see for example, Knetsch and Sinden, 1984). 
Consequently, the Paretian optimal solution to an environmental problem depends 
upon how rights are assigned to use the environment. 
Let us modify Figure 1 to take account of this possibility assuming (as Coase did) that 
the transaction costs of settling an environmental conflict are zero once legal rights 
are clearly assigned. For simplicity, assume that the marginal willingness to pay of 
polluters to pollute does not differ from their marginal willingness to accept 
compensation to reduce their pollution. This is represented by the line ABCD in 
Figure 2. However, the marginal willingness of victims to pay to avoid pollution is 
shown by line OCE and their marginal willingness to accept compensation to permit 
pollution is indicated by the higher line OBF. It follows that if polluters are given the 
legal rights to pollute, the Paretian optimal level of pollution emission is x2 per period 
whereas if victims are given the right to a pollution-free environment the Paretian 
optimal level of pollution emission is x1. Hence, the Paretian optimal solution (the 
solution that maximizes wealth) depends on how legal rights to use the environment 
are assigned. In such circumstances, Posner’s principle of wealth maximization is not 
able to determine which Paretian solution is just. 
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Figure 2: Diagram used to show that policies to achieve wealth maximization are 
not independent of the allocation of entitlements (such as, legal rights) to 
parties having a stake in resource use. 
5. The Taking of Property Rights by the State: The Exercise of Eminent 
Domain 
In all countries, the state has the right to take away private property or to take away 
customary or established rights of legal entities to use natural resources (for further 
discussion, see for example, Tisdell, 2009a, Ch.4). Posner (1987) argues that the 
taking away of private property rights by the state may be justified if it adds to wealth. 
However, the mere fact that such actions can add to wealth (that is bring about a 
potential Paretian improvement) does not justify them. From the point of view of 
dispensing justice several additional matters need to be considered. These include 
what compensation, if any, should be paid to those who lose their pre-existing rights 
and the purpose for which these rights are taken. 
Secure private property rights are the foundation of market-based economic systems 
and tend to promote the productive use of resources as well as in various 
circumstances, their conservation. An increase in the likelihood that private property 
will be seized either without compensation (or adequate compensation) being paid to 
prior holders of these rights, undermines the wealth-creating role of the market system. 
However, markets are not perfect in their operation. Various types of market failures 
(such as environmental externalities and the presence of commodities with the 
attributes of public goods) can occur which result in the market system not 
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maximizing wealth. In such circumstances, state intervention in the economic system 
involving the taking away of pre-existing property rights or their restriction may add 
to wealth. 
The nature of private property rights in resources to be taken by the state may be an 
important consideration in the dispensation of justice. If the legal entity has a formal 
legal title to the property (for example, land) it would be considered unjust in most 
societies for the state to take such property without paying adequate compensation to 
the owner. In most cases, it would seem reasonable that at least the market value of 
property be paid to the owner if it is taken by the state. Furthermore, individuals may 
genuinely value their private property at more than its market value. In such cases, 
they are not fully compensated by payment of its market value. In addition, the taking 
of such property may impose transaction costs on them which they would otherwise 
not occur. For example, if the property is a residential property, a resident-owner 
would have to find alternative accommodation and will incur extra costs in doing so. 
This possibility is recognized in paying compensation for property taken by the state 
in Canada. 
A second consideration in the taking of such property rights is the purpose for which 
the rights are taken. If the property is taken to supply a private good, it is less likely to 
seem to be justified than if it is taken to supply a collective good. For example, 
suppose that an individual has a large lot of land in a city which is used by the 
individual for his/her pleasure. The lot would add more to collective wealth if it were 
used for apartments, a shopping centre, or a public park or new access road. The first 
two alternative uses would be for the supply of private goods whereas the latter would 
supply collective goods. There may be less public sympathy for taking of rights in the 
former cases than in the latter ones. 
The taking of customary rights in the use of natural resources or the environment is a 
more complicated issue because formal legal rights do not exist. Whether or not 
compensation is paid for the taking away of such rights varies considerably by 
jurisdiction and individual cases. The law in this regard is far from settled. It seems 
often to be applied as a means of social or political conflict resolution rather than as 
an instrument for the dispensation of justice. This raises the possibility that the legal 
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system has multiple objectives of which the dispensation of justice is not always the 
overriding one. Settlement of social conflict may also be an objective of legal systems. 
6. Concluding Comments 
It has been argued that Posner’s principle of wealth maximization is not an adequate 
basis for the dispensation of justice because if fails to give adequate attention to the 
income distribution consequences of the law. On the other hand, Rawls’ principle of 
justice relies too heavily on assessment of the income distribution consequences of 
policies or laws. Both theories of justice are based on extreme positions. In dispensing 
justice both aspects (wealth effects and distributional consequences) should be 
weighed up. The trade-off between these factors is liable to be influenced by 
community values. However, wealth creation and distributional consequences are not 
the only important factors in the dispensation of justice, as was illustrated by the 
taking of property rights by the state. In addition, one can doubt whether the sole 
purpose of the law is to dispense justice. An important aspect of the law may be to 
promote social or political stability by helping to resolve social conflicts about 
resource use. Legal decisions that resolve such social conflict may not always be 
accepted as just and certainly are not always wealth-maximizing (compare Tisdell, 
2009b). 
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